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Uncertain Certainty?:  





The European Court of Human Rights declares a single standard of proof (‘SoP’): proof 
beyond reasonable doubt (‘BRD’). Yet the accuracy of this claim and the threshold’s 
appropriateness have both been challenged. This article uniquely considers and clarifies the 
Court’s interpretation and application of its SoP. Demonstrating SoP is capable of both broad 
and narrow interpretations, it shows the Court interprets SoP only narrowly. This 
understanding confirms BRD as the applicable standard, whose use is then considered 
through detailed examination of the case law. The analysis shows that although the Court’s 
conception and approach to BRD necessarily accommodate some doubt, violations are found 
with a consistently high level of certainty. There is however, a striking inconsistency in 
references made to the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Rules do not fully capture the Court’s 
approach. Addressing this, as the article proposes, would strengthen both the consistency and 
legitimacy of relevant decisions.  
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1     Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’)1 follows its own declared standard of 
proof (‘SoP’): violation of a Convention right must be proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
(‘BRD’).2 Strikingly, BRD is an evidential standard alien to civil law systems from which 
almost all of the Court’s judges are drawn.3 Moreover, the Court distinguishes BRD from its 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter: c.bicknell@exeter.ac.uk; Academic Fellow of the Honourable Society 
of the Inner Temple. My thanks to Steven Greer, Stephen Skinner and Andrea Lista for their comments on 
previous drafts; Rebecca Helm and Richard Edwards for helpful discussions; and James Bicknell for his 
patience.  
1 The European Convention of Human Rights is referred to interchangeably as the ‘ECHR’ and ‘the 
Convention’.  
2 The standard was first set in Ireland v the United Kingdom Appl no 5310/71 Merits and Just Satisfaction (18 
January 1978).  
3 S Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (OUP 2006), 
218-220. DOI 10.1017/CB09780511494963; U Erdal ‘Burden and standard of proof in proceedings under the 
European Convention’ (2001) European Law Review 68, 74; L Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1995), 160. More generally: M J Bond. ‘The standard of proof in international 
commercial arbitration’, (2011) 77(3) Arbitration 304-317; C Brower ‘Evidence before International Tribunals: 
The Need for Some Standard Rules’ (1994) 24(1) The International Lawyer 47-58; Redfern et al, ‘The 
Standards and Burden of Proof in International Law’ (1994) 10(3) Arbitration International 317-364. The civil 
law systems themselves have by no means a uniform approach, see: M Taruffo, ‘Rethinking the Standards of 
Proof’ (2003) 51(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 659- 677. DOI: 10.2307/3649122. 
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application in domestic criminal courts where (in common law countries) it is most familiar. 
In particular, at the ECHR level the standard does not have the same underlying purpose:4 
instead of setting the threshold to establish the guilt or innocence of an individual it is the 
measure against which a breach of state responsibility under the Convention is found.5 It has 
therefore been noted that BRD applied by the Court is ‘not interpreted as the same high 
degree of probability as in domestic and criminal trials’.6 The Court’s approach includes a 
willingness to take into account circumstantial evidence, make inferences, reverse the burden 
of proof, and use constructive knowledge in its evaluation, all of which creates room for 
some level of doubt.  
The Court’s SoP carries obvious importance, not least because it can determine the 
outcome of a case.7 A clear understanding of the Court’s interpretation and approach to its 
SoP should thus be vital to human rights practitioners and scholars alike. Oddly however, the 
topic has received very little attention and the academic literature that does exist presents a 
confusing picture since it has been variously argued: differential standards are in fact used, of 
which BRD is just one8; that ‘in practical terms’ the standard has been ‘abandoned’ by the 
Court altogether9; and (in judicial dissent) that BRD has no place in the ECHR case law and 
should yield to a different standard.10   
                                                 
4 This is acknowledged by the Court itself. See for example: Nachova and Others v Bulgaria [GC] Appl nos 
43577/98 and 43579/98 Merits (6 July 2005); Creangă v Romania [GC] Appl no 29226/03 Merits (23 February 
2012); El-Masri v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC] Appl no. 39630/09 Merits (13 December 
2012). See also Napier v Scottish Ministers 2005 1 SC 307. 
5 P Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (4th edn, OUP, 2017), 202. DOI: 
10.1017/9781780688008.032; and Ireland supra n 2.  
6 Leach ibid. at 202. 
7 See below.  
8 In particular M Smith, ‘The adjudicatory fact-finding tools of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 
European Human Rights Law Review 206, 211; M Ambrus, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and 
Standards of Proof: An Evidentiary Approach towards the Margin of Appreciation’ in L Gruszczynski and W 
Werner (eds), Deference in International Courts and Tribunals (OUP 2014), Chapter 13. DOI: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716945.001.0001.  
9 Erdal, supra n 3 at 85.  
10 Ibid. citing instances of judicial criticism. 
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 The present article addresses the gap in current understanding of the Court’s SoP: 
taking as its key aim to clarify SoP as it is declared, interpreted and applied specifically by 
the Court. Unique from other analyses, the Court’s SoP is necessarily approached herein as a 
self-contained, stand-alone concept, specific and subject only to the Court’s interpretation 
and application. It is shown that whilst SoP is capable of both broad and narrow 
interpretations, the Court’s interpretation of the term is narrow. Based on this narrow 
construction, the Court names BRD as the applicable evidential standard. Analysis of the 
Court’s conception and approach to BRD shows allowance of a certain level of doubt for two 
key reasons: the Court does not always have full access to evidence of facts; and in certain 
circumstances in response to which the Court reverses the burden of proof, there is 
necessarily a structural accommodation of doubt within its approach. Nevertheless, detailed 
examination of the case law indicates that violations are found with a consistently high level 
of certainty. However, the case law also highlights inconsistent reference made to the Rules 
of Court, which themselves offer an incomplete reflection of the Court’s approach to proof 
when faced with an uncooperative respondent state. Both may have implications for the 
strength, efficiency and legitimacy of decisions, and a way forwards is proposed.    
In what follows, Section 2 clarifies key terms. Section 3 indicates three specific 
tensions obscuring present understanding of the Court’s SoP: divergent interpretations of 
SoP; divergent interpretations of BRD; and concern that BRD is too high a standard. Section 
4 examines the first tension, demonstrating the Court conceives the term ‘SoP’ only 
narrowly, and on which basis declares its standard is BRD. Sections 5-7 then examine the 
Court’s interpretation, approach and application of BRD. Section 5 outlines the Court’s 
specific approach to establishing proof BRD, and some contextual detail explaining the need 
for it. Section 6 elaborates, discussing the origins of the Court’s use of BRD and the 
development of its general approach. It also highlights inconsistency regarding the Court’s 
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reference to its Rules of Court, arguing this should be addressed. Section 7 examines the 
application of the Court’s approach in the case law, having particular regard to the Court’s 
rigour and the certainty of its findings that result. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Clarifying the Terms  
Three key terms are frequently referred to in this discussion: standard of proof (SoP), burden 
of proof (‘BoP’), and beyond reasonable doubt (BRD). It is noted already that the Court’s 
declared SoP is BRD. Though the two are related, they are nevertheless separate labels and 
are treated as such in the discussion. For present purposes it suffices to regard BRD as a 
subset of SoP, recognising that within legal systems it is just one standard available among 
others.11 However, SoP is also closely related to, but distinct from, BoP and it is relevant at 
this point to clarify these terms and their relationship with one another.  
In essence, BoP places the onus on one party to do the proving, whilst SoP can be 
explained as the ‘degree of satisfaction’ to which the court or tribunal must be persuaded of 
that proof.12 It ‘fixes the necessary and sufficient degree of belief or confidence the fact-
finder, upon evaluation of the evidence, must have in the truth of [a disputed proposition].’13 
To demonstrate the connection between the concepts evidence textbooks on the law of 
England and Wales14 commonly cite Lord Hoffmann’s explanation of BoP:  
If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a ‘fact in issue’) a judge or jury must 
decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for finding that it might have 
happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are zero and 
one. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is in doubt, the doubt is 
                                                 
11 Eg. In civil cases Bond supra n 3 identifies: balance of probabilities; clear and convincing; beyond reasonable 
doubt; intime conviction, and free assessment. Also Taruffo supra n 3.  
12 R Glover, Murphy on Evidence, (15th edn, OUP 2017), 89. DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198788737.001.0001. 
13 HL Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law (OUP 2008), 178. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228300.001.0001  
14 The single common law country in the Council of Europe. 
5 
 
resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party 
who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of zero is returned and the 
fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it a value of one is 
returned and the fact is treated as having happened.15     
 
SoP accounts for exactly how persuaded a judge or jury must be to ‘discharge’ the BoP and 
return a value of one in the above scenario. According to Laudan the rationality and not just 
the strength of a court’s confidence in the fact is ‘crucial’.16 It is beyond the scope of the 
present article to discuss this rationality in detail. But it is noteworthy that historically, the 
Court’s approach to evidence had been arguably illogical, possibly irrational, and  
certainly counter-productive.17 The inequity of the outcome in Kurt v Turkey,18 discussed in 
Section 6, when read against the wider context at the time, has subsequently informed the 
Court’s willingness in certain situations, to make inferences and reverse the burden of proof: 
an approach that in the circumstances, can be regarded as more rational than previously. 
Indeed, it is demonstrated in the discussion below that at the risk of the charge BRD is not the 
Court’s SoP at all,19 reversing the BoP actually operates as something of a leveller, bringing 
greater parity between parties in the dispute.  Kokott notes this reflexive approach in 
international tribunals, and suggests that though they do not always distinguish the ‘degree of 
persuasion’ required by the BoP from its allocation, both reflect ‘a balancing between the 
                                                 
15 Lord Hoffmann in Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) CAFCASS Intervening [2009] 1 
AC 11, [2]. 
16 L Laudan, ‘Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?’ (2003) 9 Legal Theory 295, 304-5. Also Ho supra n 13, 178-
185. DOI: 10.1017/S1352325203000132.  
17 GS Sethi, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on Issues of Forced Disappearances’ (2001) 
8 Human Rights Brief 29; A Reidy, F Hampson and K Boyle, ‘Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey’ (1997) 15(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 161-174.  
18 Kurt v Turkey Appl no 24276/94 Merits and Just Satisfaction (25 May 1998).  
19 Erdal supra n 3. Also H Keller and C Heri, ‘Enforced Disappearance and the European Court of Human 
Rights: A ‘Wall of Silence’, Fact-Finding difficulties and States as ‘Subversive Objectors’’ (2014) 12 Journal of 




particular individual right as compared with the state interest.’20 She also observes that 
‘external circumstances’ such as ‘the time, manner and place of an occurrence influence the 
allocation of the burden of proof.’21 With this in mind, let us turn our attention to the article’s 
core task: examining the Court’s approach to SoP.  
 
3  Three Tensions  
Three inherent tensions surrounding the Court’s SoP presently obscure our full understanding 
of it. In this Section they are outlined, and are subsequently examined through the rest of the 
work as a means of more fully making sense of the Court’s SoP. Briefly stated, the tensions 
are rooted in: 1. academic commentary declaring the Court has differential SoPs against the 
Court’s view it has just one, BRD; 2. difference in interpretation of BRD between domestic 
Courts, commentators, and the Court, which informs criticism the Court does not meet the 
BRD standard, and 3. concern at the appropriateness of BRD as the Court’s chosen SoP, 
being such a very high standard, yet applied to prove the most serious of human rights 
abuses. The first two tensions are variants of essentially the same problem: descriptive 
accounts of what the SoP is, and how it is to be evaluated, are approached in markedly 
different ways depending on varying points of reference. In particular, this is whether the 
respective concepts are viewed self-referentially by the Court, or more broadly in academic 
commentary which invariably brings additional preconceptions to the analysis. The third 
tension relates to a normative difficulty far beyond the scope of this article to resolve. 
However, highlighting the problem and related issues within it can improve understanding 
and to a certain degree explain the Court’s declared approach and its implementation. It is for 
this purpose only the third tension is engaged in this work. 
                                                 
20 J Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common Law 




Regarding the first tension between claims in the literature there are multiple or 
differential standards of proof in the ECHR system whereas the Court insists it has just one, 
BRD, neither assertion is actually incorrect. The fact they stand apparently at odds is a 
consequence of difference in framing. The term ‘SoP’ is not understood or used in quite the 
same way between the Court and commentators, the latter tending to conceive it much more 
widely as encompassing, for example, margin of appreciation cases. This point is developed 
in Section 4, but in essence SoP is capable of both broad and narrow meanings, of which the 
Court applies the narrower. Broadly conceived, SoP encapsulates two distinct ideas: SoP in a 
very pure form, which relates to evidence of (proving) fact; and a standard which, because no 
fact is in dispute, is more akin to persuasion (of an argument or position) than strictly to 
proof.22 The Court, where it declares BRD to be its standard, is referring to the first, and once 
this case is made out, this article confines itself thereafter to examining SoP in the narrower 
sense. Though there is merit in examining the Court’s approach within the wider meaning of 
SoP23 doing so is beyond the scope of this article whose concern is to develop understanding 
of the Court’s approach to SoP. The narrower focus on BRD aligns more fully with this 
purpose and also makes possible a more detailed examination of BRD than space would 
otherwise allow. 
The second tension is a perceived difference of view as to the level and quality of 
evidence needed to satisfy BRD. There is very little literature on the Court’s approach. 
Nevertheless its use of circumstantial evidence, - for example, presuming death without 
confirmation death has occurred, - causes Erdal to declare the standard has been abandoned.24 
Where there is difficulty ascertaining the full facts, such as what happened to a person last 
seen in state custody but whose whereabouts are now unknown, the Court may make 
                                                 
22 See section 4.   
23 Greer, supra n 3 at 211.  
24 Erdal, supra n 3 at 68.  Also Judge Matscher in his partly dissenting judgment in Kurt, supra n 18, on which 
see Smith, supra n 8 at 222.  
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inferences and reverse the BoP, reverting it to the state. This is discussed in detail below but 
has been a source of contention. The Court’s more recent references to ‘constructive 
knowledge’, - a very particular kind of inference, - presents an additional challenge to the 
perceived strength of BRD as interpreted and applied by the Court.25 
At face value these interpretative techniques could be regarded as an error in labelling 
for argument that in spite of its claims to the contrary, the Court applies a standard that is not 
BRD.  However, to comprehend the Court’s interpretation, this article adopts a slightly 
different approach to other critiques, taking as its start point that there are ‘different 
conceptions of the same concept’ (BRD), applied and/or expected between domestic courts, 
external commentators, and the Court.26 In this way, the content is engaged with the aim of 
determining the Court’s conception of BRD, which is necessarily approached as a self-
contained, stand-alone concept; especially appropriate given the firmness and consistency of 
the Court’s assertions BRD is its SoP. Though comparison with others’ conceptions is still 
possible, this article’s approach removes the risk of transposing external conceptions onto the 
Court as a basis of criticism. The core undertaking here is to understand, not to condemn, and 
furthermore, transposition would require subjective choice of a ‘better’ or ‘ideal’ conception 
and thereby risk being methodologically unsound.   
BRD is not subject to interpretation common between the Court and domestic 
courts,27 but neither is there agreement between or even within relevant domestic 
jurisdictions as to its correct interpretation.28 Although we can approach BRD as (arguably) a 
                                                 
25 Al Nashiri v Poland Appl no 28761/11 Merits and Just Satisfaction (24 July 2014); Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v 
Poland Appl no 7511/13 Merits and Just Satisfaction (24 July 2014). See discussion in section 7.  
26 Borrowed from George Lestas’ evaluation of divergent interpretations of autonomous concepts under the 
ECHR. G Lestas A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2007), 52. 
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203437.001.0001. 
27 Supra n 4 and Leach, supra n 5.  
28 For particularly good discussion, Z Long, ‘“Beyond Reasonable Doubt” in the Chinese Legal Context’ (2014) 
Peking University Law Journal 339-371. DOI: 10.1080/20517483.2014.11424475.  
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measure of certainty,29 or of truth,30 there is no clear agreement on its definition31 which, - 
taking into account it is most often applied by untrained juries in common law countries, - 
makes variance of interpretation and application of BRD to a set of facts inevitable. At its 
historical origins in English criminal law BRD developed to accommodate circumstantial 
evidence,32 and there is argument in the modern literature that the standard does and should 
carry a degree of flexibility.33 Even if broadly accepted BRD is a measure, albeit a very high 
measure, of certainty, conceptions of it are by no means constant. Accordingly, though it 
helps our understanding of the Court to observe the tension exists and is capable of obscuring 
understanding of the Court’s application of BRD, it does not serve this article’s purpose to 
make difference between the Court and other courts, domestic or international, the core 
focus. The purpose here is to explore SoP at the ECHR level, which – once the first tension is 
resolved, - means specifically, the Court’s understanding of BRD. Hence it is equally beyond 
the scope of this article to make a comprehensive account of domestic approaches to BRD. 
Instead, engaging the second tension, the work closely examines the Court’s jurisprudence to 
elucidate its particular approach in direct answer to the key question: how does the Court 
interpret and apply BRD?  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 ML Friedland, “Searching for Truth in the Criminal Justice System” (2014) 60 Criminal Law Quarterly, 487-
521. 
31  K Muller-Johnson, MK Dharmi, and S Lundrigan, ‘Effects of judicial instructions and juror characteristics on 
interpretations of beyond reasonable doubt’ (2018) 24(2) Psychology, Crime and Law 117 – 133. DOI: 
10.1080/1068316x.2017.1394461; B Davidson and R Pargetter, ‘Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ (1987) 65(2) 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 182-187. There have been attempts and arguments to quantify the value also, 
for example a cluster of related articles: J Franklin, ‘Case Comment - United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 
2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): Quantification of the Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt Standard’ (2006) 5 Law, 
Probability and Risk 159-165. DOI: 10.1093/lpr/mgl017; P Tillers and J Gottfried, ‘Case Comment - United 
States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof 
beyond a Reasonable Doubt is Unquantifiable’ (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 135-157. DOI: 
10.1093/LPR/MGL015; JB Weinstein and I Dewsbury, ‘Comment on the Meaning of Proof beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt’ (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 167-173. DOI: 10.1093/LPR/MGL016.  
32 Shapiro, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” and “Probable Cause”: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-
American Law of Evidence (1991).  
33 See for example: E Stoffelmayr and S Seidman Diamond, ‘The Conflict between Precision and Flexibility in 




The third tension surrounds the appropriateness of BRD as the Court’s SoP. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to consider this in detail. But it does serve our understanding 
to highlight the issue briefly here, and elements of this tension do inevitably arise in the 
discussion below. The origin of disquiet is that cases in which BRD is the applied standard 
are almost exclusively cases that involve disappearance, loss of life and/or torture. These are 
all matters that Greer, for instance, suggests require a strong ‘priority to rights’ in the Court’s 
approach, much stronger than needed for Articles 8-11 for example.34 BRD seems a 
remarkably high threshold, especially in cases when the state attempts to undermine judicial 
process. Although this article does not build on the wider interpretation of SoP identified in 
the first tension, it is notable that commentary which has approached SoP in this broader way 
considers Articles 8-11 to attach a much lower evidential threshold.35 This certainly makes 
BRD where it is applied, seem odd, arguably even inexplicable, especially when the Court’s 
purpose, to protect individual’s rights against the state, is factored in.36   
A difficulty facing the Court is that it must be alive to its position as an international 
court and any challenges to its legitimacy, actual or potential,37 that inevitably arise. BRD is 
broadly consistent with the evidential standard elsewhere in international law.38 Where the 
findings against a state ‘imply a negative ethical judgment’ upon it, the tendency is towards 
this higher threshold.39 It is arguably a strong safeguard against challenges to the legitimacy 
                                                 
34 Greer, supra n 3 at chapter 4. 
35 See section 4 below. 
36 The Court’s purpose has been explained in numerous ways. This statement is not intended as in any way 
definitive.  
37 See K Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (CUP 
2015). DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139644471. 
38 R Wolfrum and M Möldner, ‘International Courts and Tribunals – Evidence’ [2013] Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e26 > accessed 19 September 2018. Note, there are parallels between the approach in Corfu 
Channel, United Kingdom v Albania ICGJ 199 (ICJ 1949) and that of the ECtHR in the way it expresses its 
approach to evidence. See G Dobry, ‘The Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Establish International 
Responsibility’ (1958) 44 Transactions of the Grotius Society 63. 
39 Ibid.  
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of judgments, and furthermore, it is a means of providing as far as possible an account of 
truth which is often desperately sought by family members if not the victims themselves. 
 
4 Standard of Proof: the Subject of Differential Interpretations  
Let us address, and eliminate from further discussion, the first tension: the disjoin between 
the Court’s insistence it has a single SoP against a view in the, admittedly sparse literature 
relating to the Court directly, that it applies different standards. The content of judgments 
informing this perception varies, but the overall finding can be summarized that the standard 
applied by the Court depends on the type of case before it. This is true within many domestic 
legal systems where it is relatively uncontroversial.40 The key difference is the Court’s claim 
it has just one SoP. There are two distinct bases in the Court’s jurisprudence on which the 
view of multiple SoPs has been suggested: where margin of appreciation cases are discussed 
in relation to SoP; and where the future-looking nature of non-refoulement cases is compared 
with cases that seek violation findings for past events. The key issue in the first tension is 
hence the scope of content to which SoP is used directly as a label.  
Where the Court’s SoP is discussed with reference to margin of appreciation cases, it 
is clear the term SoP is more broadly applied by commentators than it is by the Court itself.41 
Ambrus’ detailed critique of the Court’s SoP is a good example. Although Ambrus does not 
raise any direct challenge to the Court’s position (that it has a single SoP), her interpretation 
stands at very clear odds with it since she indicates multiple SoPs.42 In that analysis however, 
the type and range of cases she considers is much broader than those in which the Court 
declares its standard. If we can assume, as seems reasonable, the presence or absence of a 
declared SoP in a decision identifies cases in which the Court considers it relevant, this starts 
                                                 
40 Note possible exceptions: M Schweizer, ‘The civil standard of proof—what is it, actually?’ (2016) 20(3) The 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 217–234. DOI: 10.1177/1365712716645227. 
41 Examples: Ambrus (n 8), Greer (n 3) and Smith (n 8).  
42 Ibid.  
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to explain the variance. Cases indicated by the Court are examined in the Sections below, but 
it has already been observed these are generally cases involving disappearance, loss of life 
and torture claims. Ambrus’ work covers the full range of ECHR rights and decisions, 
drawing links between the subject matter before the Court and the way it approaches 
evidence, including its use of language. As she explains it: under Article 2 and 3 applications, 
the Court refers to SoP, whereas in Articles 8-11 and Article 14 applications it refers 
respectively to ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘level of scrutiny’. For the Article 2 and 3 case 
law ‘the main issue is often to prove whether or not certain facts are true or an event 
occurred.’43 In margin of appreciation cases by contrast ‘[t]he question posed by the Court … 
[is]: to what extent should the Court be convinced that the State was entitled to interfere with 
the right at stake?’44 This assessment is correct. But by their content and the issue the Court is 
called on to determine, these are markedly different points: different content requiring ‘proof’ 
and different ways of ‘proving’ between actually demonstrating the truth of fact, or 
alternatively, without any need to prove fact, persuading the Court that position  is to be 
preferred to position . Greer regards the Court’s interpretative work similarly where he sees 
the Court’s task in margin of appreciation cases is determining the scope of the right(s) at 
issue.45 On Ambrus’ evaluation ‘[t]he degree of ... conviction varies, usually described in 
terms of the different margins of appreciation, which can be translated as different standards 
of proof placed on the respondent.’46 
Where does this leave us? And what does it tell us about the Court’s interpretation of 
SoP? It seems clear that the disjoin between Ambrus’ analysis and the Court’s single declared 
SoP hinges on semantics of what proof is considered to entail: a point which relates to both 
                                                 
43 Ambrus, supra n 8 at 238. 
44 Ibid 240. 
45 Greer, supra n 3 at chapter 4.  
46 Ambrus, supra n 8 at 240. 
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the content of what must be proven, and how (with what evidence, or what argument) it is 
proven. Critically, there are two distinct kinds of ECHR cases; 1. those which require the 
discovery of facts to establish a factual situation in which a violation occurred; and 2. those 
involving a weighing up of competing considerations through such principles as 
proportionality of the margin of appreciation, leading to a judgment that a given right has, or 
has not been violated in the circumstances. In very simple terms, the division is between 
proof of facts and proof of a different quality, of a more persuasive kind, that a given position 
is correct. The first type is, or at least should be, the more objective of the two and calls to 
mind Lord Hoffmann’s words, because this also is binary: a fact or factual set of 
circumstances is either true or it is not. Conversely, with her focus on margin of appreciation 
Ambrus is arguably more concerned with standard of review, which ‘generally refers to the 
degree of deference that a court grants to institutional decisions taken by other authorities.’47 
That application of SoP as a label is not wrong, it is simply different. SoP is capable of a 
wide interpretation that includes both kinds of case, facts or persuasion, and it is also capable 
of a narrower handling, concerned only with proof of fact or, more specifically, of a 
Convention violation. Without any exception, the cases in which the Court has expressly 
declared its SoP are the first type of case, requiring proof of facts. 
Non-refoulement cases have also yielded a finding that the Court has more than one 
SoP48 and we must consider their fit within this fact / persuasion dichotomy. Consistent with 
the findings above Smith writes ‘there is no formalized standard or burden of proof in the 
Strasbourg case law’, and that SoP ‘depends to a certain degree on the issue raised under the 
Convention.’49 But Smith introduces the relevance of time to this indicating that BRD is 
                                                 
47 Ragni, ‘Standard of Review and the Margin of Appreciation before the International Court of Justice’ in 
Gruszczynski and Werner (eds), supra n 8.  
48 Smith, supra n 8. 
49 Ibid at 210 citing Rogge, ‘Fact-Finding’ in RStJ Macdonald et al. (eds), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (1993) 677 at 678.  
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applied to ‘backward-looking inquiries’ which consider whether a right has (ie. in the past) 
been violated.50 Cases relating to removal or deportation are future-looking and the Court 
instead requires ‘substantial grounds’ that there is a ‘real risk’ of violation. This is a much 
lower threshold to meet and Smith correctly identifies it as an SoP. In such cases the Court is 
silent however, and does not formally declare or label this an SoP. We could ask how and 
why this should be, but in practical terms, labelling would add nothing. The Court’s 
requirement for this type of application is visible in its decisions.  
The question remains: why would the Court still insist it has a single SoP, BRD? That 
insistence almost certainly relates to points noted above regarding the third tension in Section 
3 surrounding the Court’s position as an international court, legitimacy concerns and the 
nature of the rights and case law involved where that standard is declared. But the silence in 
this context may equally be informed by the wide/narrow conceptions of SoP within which, it 
is perfectly plausible, the Court does not regard ‘real risk’ to fall. Of the two types of case, 
requiring proof of facts or persuasion of a position, ‘real risk’ evaluation must fall within the 
second category because the Court must look at the possibility of what could occur rather 
than factual evidence of what has. Quite obviously a thing that has not yet happened cannot 
become proven fact. This being so, the silence over SoP seems to confirm the argument: the 
Court (formally) interprets SoP in a narrow sense as referring to factual proof a violation has 
occurred. The Court’s approach to SoP being the interest of this article, examining its use of 
this narrower interpretation is the focus through the remainder of the work.    
 
5 The Court and “Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: the Problem in Sketch  
The Court, as we know, declares a single SoP: proof beyond reasonable doubt. But while it 
has been shown the Court interprets SoP differently from some of the external commentary, 
                                                 
50 Smith, supra n 8 at 210. 
15 
 
its approach to the standard even when narrowly defined does not easily leave the sense that 
BRD is or can be satisfied in every case. That is the crux of this discussion’s second tension, 
and resolving it appears at first glance to raise three key questions: how does the Court 
interpret the BRD standard? How does the Court apply the BRD standard? And does the 
Court, in its jurisprudence, satisfy BRD on every occasion?  
The first two questions are closely linked and difficult to pull apart since the Court’s 
application of BRD should be indicative of its interpretation. Nevertheless, so far as possible, 
the approach below covers interpretation first, before fleshing in more detail on its 
application in the case law. The resulting evaluation is built directly on observation of the 
jurisprudence: the point of reference is the ECHR system itself. The third question however, 
is not the right question for this discussion. Asking whether the Court satisfies BRD every 
time requires a value judgment because, much like the first tension, it hinges on interpretation 
of what BRD is and how it can be satisfied. As observed in Section 3, there is no full 
agreement within domestic jurisdictions on this point. It follows that unless we are willing to 
impose an external interpretation on the Court as the correct one, once the first question has 
been discovered, so long as the Court is always true to its own interpretation of BRD, the 
answer to whether the Court really satisfies that must logically always be ‘yes’. To avoid 
arguing in circles, we can therefore be alive to the fact there are different conceptions of this 
key concept without the need to select or favour any particular conception of our own, and 
continue the approach of unpacking the Court’s interpretation of its SoP as a stand-alone 
concept. It is much more relevant to developing an understanding of SoP in the Convention 
system to concentrate attention to identifying and examining the Court’s own conception of 
BRD. As a start point, without becoming bound up in external conceptions, it is helpful to 
highlight some of the concerns over the Court’s use of BRD. In this way a general sketch of 
the Court’s approach is necessary here, and some contextual reasons for its adapted or 
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‘nuanced’51  approach to BRD are explained. Section 6 elaborates on this to discuss the 
origins of the Court’s use of BRD, and the development of its general approach.  
Suggestion that the Court has a nuanced approach to BRD begins with its own 
explanation. The Court standardly acknowledges that its SoP does not have the same 
underlying purpose as that adopted in criminal courts at the domestic level.52 From its first 
formulation of that standard put forward in Ireland v United Kingdom and repeated ever 
since, its willingness to draw inferences has been visible:  
According to its [the Court’s] established case-law, proof may follow from the 
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar 
unrebutted presumptions of fact.53    
 
Furthermore, the ability to make presumptions when a state is not cooperating in the judicial 
process is now codified in the Rules of Court54 and is part of the fabric of its approach. 
Uncooperative states are indeed the main source of the problem, and it should be noted that 
establishing facts has presented an issue in only comparatively few cases. The exhaustion of 
domestic remedies requirement under Article 35§1 ECHR to bring a case to Strasbourg, and 
the subsidiary nature of the Court, means that in the vast majority of cases the facts have 
already long since been established.55 This no doubt accounts for the relative lack of 
academic literature about the standard. Nevertheless, the facts are not always fully settled, 
and this occurs primarily when a respondent state is not being fully cooperative in the 
process, usually by withholding or failing to provide vital information to the Court. The 
Court on these occasions finds itself in a position at least approximating that of a court of first 
                                                 
51 Keller and Heri, supra n 19 at 739.  
52 Supra n 4. 
53 Ireland (n 2), para 161. Repeated verbatim since, for example: Kasymakhunov v Russia Appl no 
29604/12 Merits and Just Satisfaction (14 November 2013), para 100.  
54 Rule 44C§1 discussed below.  
55 Erdal, supra n 3 at 71.  
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instance,56 and though ‘sensitive[ity] to the subsidiary nature of its role’ makes it ‘cautious’ 
to approach it in this way, circumstances sometimes make it ‘unavoidable’.57 Greater 
consideration may be given then to circumstantial evidence, with the general approach of 
making inferences and reversing the BoP such that the State must disprove the disputed facts. 
Here begins the criticism, not that the Court’s approach is incorrect, but that its standard is 
not strictly BRD.  
Erdal’s concern over death being ‘discovered’ without real proof of death was noted 
above. In addition, Keller and Heri observe that in disappearance cases the Court makes a 
‘departure’ from the BRD standard.58 It is typical of this type of case that the State is not a 
cooperative partner, and instead a ‘subversive objector’, for example, withholding facts from 
the Court known only to it. As they point out, state denial is a defining aspect of 
disappearances and ‘redistribution of the burden of proof’ comes as a result not only of the 
severity of the allegations and the rights in question, but also because of ‘lack of clarity about 
the factual situation’.59 Hence, they are not critical of the approach, only observe that it does 
not fit with (their conception of) BRD as a standard.  
To make sense of the Court’s approach, context is key. This includes that the Court is 
an international court60 and that there is a power imbalance between the parties. According to 
Wolfrum and Möldner, international criminal and human rights proceedings have a rough 
equivalence with domestic criminal proceedings in which the state holds a dominant position. 
Because of this they argue that in both types of case ‘other considerations may have to be 
taken into account’.61 While obviously inter-state claims can be brought to the Court, of 
                                                 
56 Ibid.; Keller and Heri (n 19), 738. Also El-Masri, supra n 3, para 151. 
57 Al Nashiri v Poland (n 25), para 393. See also: Imakayeva v Russia Appl no 7615/02 Merits and Just 
Satisfaction (9 November 2006) para 113; Aslakhanova and Others v Russia Appl nos 2944/06, 8300/07, 
50184/07, 332/08 and 42509/10 Merits and Just Satisfaction (18 December 2012) para 96; and El-Masri (n 3) 
para 154. 
58 Keller and Heri, supra n 19 at 739. 
59 Ibid. at 738. 
60 Dzehtsiarou, supra n 37. 
61 Wolfrum and Möldner, supra n 38 at para 5.  
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which Ireland itself serves as an example, the respondent state may still control important 
information and be regarded as dominant in this way. A feature of that dominance is the 
control the State has over documentation and other evidence useful to the Court. The 
practical implications of this when BRD is the standard mean that without appropriate 
adjustment it would be straightforward for a state subvert process by withholding evidence to 
which it has exclusive access. This precise point was made by the Irish government in 
Ireland and has happened on numerous occasions with varying success for governments. The 
power differential can, and has been exploited to states’ advantage.  
Although in the domestic courts, the El-Masri litigation in the United States62 
illustrates the point well. This was a rendition case brought in the United States in which the 
executive successfully relied on its stronger position to invoke the ‘state secrets privilege’ 
and withhold relevant information. By consequence, when the courts upheld the privilege, the 
claim failed altogether, with no recourse to justice for the victim of kidnapping, false 
imprisonment, incommunicado detention, and torture.63  
In Europe lack of necessary information from the state defeated the disappearance 
claim in Kurt v Turkey,64 more on which below. Normatively, the case for adjusting the 
approach to evidence is clear and, as we know, (and since Kurt) the Court will now make 
inferences and reverse the BoP. However, this again raises the equally valid question over 
whether the standard of proof should be BRD at all (ie. the third tension). For the present it 
can be noted the justification for the high evidential standard is not abundantly clear, and has 
never been set out by the Court. 
 
                                                 
62 El-Masri v Tenet 437 F.Supp. 2d (E.D.Va. 2006); El-Masri v United States 479 F. 3d (4 Cir. 2007). For an 
excellent overview: A Vedaschi, ‘Globalization of Human Rights and Mutual Influence between Courts: The 
Innovative Reverse Path of the Right to the Truth’ in Shimon Shetreet (ed), The Culture of Judicial 
Independence, Rule of Law, and World Peace (Brill-Nijhoff 2014). DOI: 10.1163/9789004257818. 
63 All findings made subsequently by the Court El-Masri, supra n 4.  




6 “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” at the Court: Origins and the Court’s General 
Approach   
 
6.1  Origins 
The Court’s SoP is its own to decide. In addition it is not bound by any strict rules of 
evidence, but can admit what evidence it chooses.65 In Ireland v United Kingdom the Court 
indicated for the first time that BRD is the SoP it requires.66 Although the Court did not 
explain its reasons for taking up this standard, - which it did in spite of challenge from 
Ireland, - it did so following the same approach taken by the Commission in the ‘Greek 
case’.67 In the Greek case, the Commission also clarified its interpretation of ‘reasonable 
doubt’ as a ‘doubt for which reasons can be given drawn from the facts presented.’68 The 
Court has never directly used this, though in Ireland it added that ‘proof may follow from the 
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact.’69 Furthermore, ‘[i]n this context, the conduct of the Parties when 
evidence is being obtained has to be taken into account.’70  
The Court recognizes that sometimes it is not possible for an applicant to bring very 
concrete evidence of the alleged violation to the Court. This is usually a practical problem, 
such as illustrated above, symptomatic of the power dynamic operating in two dimensions: 
between applicant(s) and a respondent state on one hand, and between the state and the Court 
on the other. It is also a common indicator of a less than cooperative state in the judicial 
                                                 
65 Ireland, supra n 2, para 209. 
66 Ibid. para 161. 
67 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece Appl nos 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67 
Commission Decision (5 November 1969). 
68 Ibid. 




process. The two substantive areas in which evidence creates a particular practical difficulty 
for applicants are right to life and liberty claims concerning disappearances, and cases 
addressing possible violations of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, more often 
torture. Usually, in both types of case, the respondent state has, or ought and is therefore 
presumed to have, information which would shed further light on the issue, yet supplies only 
vague information to the Court or none at all. In such circumstances the applicant finds 
themselves at a significant disadvantage proving their case. This had catastrophic 
implications early on, as in the disappearance case Kurt v Turkey. The Court was unable (or 
unwilling) to find violations under Articles 2 and 3 because the applicant was unable to prove 
BRD that her son had been killed and/or tortured by the state. This was against a background 
when the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances had even flagged Turkey as 
having the most disappearance cases in the world at the time.71 
Disappearance cases, and Kurt in particular, can be seen as the catalyst for a change in 
the Court’s approach. In this type of case, the state’s silence, denying allegations and not 
being forthcoming with facts is part and parcel of the phenomenon. Denial is ‘a definitional 
element of enforced disappearance’,72 and invariably the state will not cooperate in court 
proceedings. It may even actively try to undermine them, on which basis Keller and Heri 
label such uncooperative states ‘subversive objectors.’73 The Court’s shift towards a 
willingness, in appropriate circumstances, to make inferences favourable to the applicant and 
reversing the BoP came initially through the case law. This was later formalized in part in the 
2004 revision to the Rules of Court so that although the Court has no real power to compel 
the respondent state to disclose information, ‘failure to participate effectively’ in proceedings 
                                                 
71 Sethi, supra n 17; UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances’ E/CN.4/1995/36 
para 402. 
72 Keller and Heri, supra n 19 at 749. 
73 Ibid. at 737-8.  
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enables it to ‘draw such inferences as it deems appropriate.’74 The rebuttable nature of those 
inferences, - that is, the reversed BoP,- is implied only. But since the full approach began 
with the case law, it is this we turn to first.  
 
6.2 Change in approach: the Case Law 
The decision in Kurt did not appear at the time to serve justice, and was deeply 
unsatisfactory.75 Two cases which followed shortly after marked a sea change in the Court’s 
approach to disappearances. On 8 July 1999, in Çakici v Turkey, the Grand Chamber handed 
down a judgment that by the detention and disappearance of Ahmet Çakici, Turkey had 
violated Articles, 2, 3 and 5 ECHR. Ahmet Çakici had disappeared after being taken into 
custody by the security services. Though the Turkish government sought to rely on Kurt to 
defeat the claim, the Court instead distinguished the cases explaining ‘in the Kurt case, 
although the applicant’s son had been taken into detention, no other elements of evidence 
existed as regarded his treatment or fate subsequent to that.’76 
There were more details in Çakici, including from witnesses with whom he had been 
incarcerated, about what had happened to Çakici during his detention: he was beaten, had 
broken a rib, his head was split open, and he was taken for interrogation a number of times, 
where he received electric shocks and was beaten further.77 Turkey disputed the facts and so 
the Commission undertook its own an investigation. Faced with a government that was, to 
borrow Keller and Heri’s term, most assuredly a ‘subversive objector’, - including that one 
witness called on by the Commission, Hikmet Aksoy, himself disappeared before giving 
evidence, - the Commission found it apt to make inferences. In particular, the Commission 
made ‘very strong inferences’ from the authorities’ claim they had found the victim’s identity 
                                                 
74 Rules of Court; 44C§1. 
75 Supra n 17. 
76 Çakıcı v Turkey [GC] Appl no 23657/94 (8 July 1999) para 85. 
77 Ibid. paras 15-16. 
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card on the body of a dead terrorist.78 They also took into account documentation that was 
incomplete and/or misleading and witness statements made on the state’s behalf that similarly 
did not add up. As the government could not account for what had happened to Çakici, the 
Court took the same line as the Commission, holding that this created a presumption Çakici 
had died. Finding Turkey liable for his death, the Court was clear there was ‘sufficient 
circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements, on which [this] may be concluded 
beyond reasonable doubt’.79  
It is questionable how far this case on its own represented a shift in the Court’s 
approach. Through Ireland, the Court had already long since declared inferences (a 
significant plural) were capable of discharging the BRD standard, where ‘strong, clear and 
concordant’. The variance between Kurt and Çakici, certainly as the Court distinguished the 
cases, stays true to that original Ireland formulation, because it requires inferences which are 
not only strong, but also coexisting. Whether this does truly represent proof BRD is a 
separate question, these facts recalling Erdal’s criticism that presuming death where death is 
not fully known or established does not constitute BRD.80 Nevertheless, on the Court’s 
construction of BRD, it does.      
The Court also found the ‘required standard of proof, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt, 
that Çakici was tortured during his detention’ was supported by the evidence,81 particularly a 
detailed witness statement from a man who had shared a cell with the victim, and who had 
been subjected to similar torture. The Court did not refer directly to its SoP when finding 
Çakici's ‘unacknowledged’ detention violated Article 5 ECHR, but accepted the 
Commission’s finding, - based on witness evidence, that there were no accurate or reliable 
                                                 
78 Ibid. para 85. 
79 Ibid. para 92. 
80 Erdal, supra n 3 at 68, also supra n 24. 
81 Çakıcı, supra n 76, para 92. 
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records about people taken into custody by the Gendarmes, and that there had not been any 
meaningful inquiry into what had happened, - that he had been detained in this way.  
Çakici was followed shortly after by another disappearance case, Timurtas v Turkey, 
which was handled in a similar way. Timurtas was similarly distinguished from Kurt,82 
though not without criticism and it is the difference (and similarity) among the three cases 
which really emphasizes a shift in the Court’s thinking at this time. In his partly dissenting 
opinion, Judge Gölcüklü was unequivocal, - as the Commission had similarly pointed out, - 
Timurtas was ‘indistinguishable from the Kurt case (in which, as in this case, it was not 
established beyond all reasonable doubt that the applicant's son, Üzeyir Kurt, died in 
detention) and has nothing in common with Çakıcı’.83  
On the facts it is impossible to disagree with the first point. If anything, Timurtas’ 
detention by the authorities was less evidenced than was Kurt’s. Nevertheless the Court, 
possibly empowered by Çakici which was a Grand Chamber decision, and almost certainly 
alive to the need for a change to serve justice, followed (arguably extended) this later 
approach, holding that Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 had all been violated.  
Together Çakici and Timurtas marked a ‘positive shift’ in the Court’s approach, 
which ‘tacitly acknowledged the wider socio-political context of the 1990s within which 
unacknowledged detentions and enforced disappearances had posed serious threats to human 
life.’84 The correctness or otherwise of departing from Kurt is a historical point and barely 
important now for at least four reasons: the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’, of which 
dynamism on the part of the Court to deliver justice in line with the ECHR’s purpose is 
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surely a key aspect; the Court is not required to follow precedent, including its own; the 
Court can set its own rules of evidence (including the SoP); and this approach is now very 
firmly entrenched in the Court’s jurisprudence ever since. But there is more in this than a 
change in approach out of sensitivity to the ‘socio-political context’ and a practical need to 
deliver justice. The Court was then, and is still now keen to emphasize the circumstantial 
evidence was sufficient to meet its BRD standard, an illustration of which is even in recent 
Grand Chamber decisions that include the wording of Ireland verbatim.85 The present task is 
still elaborating and making sense of the Court’s own conception of BRD, its origins and in 
particular, how much doubt it allows for. Yet the third tension question keeps returning: why 
is the Court, which can set its own evidential standard, so faithful to BRD? 
 
6.3 Rules of Court: Rule 44C§1 
The problem of subversive objector states is quite evident. In the 1990s the Court was 
grappling with its own SoP when facing a lack of concrete evidence, as well as outright 
denial, in disappearance cases brought against Turkey. In December 2004 Rule 44C§1 was 
added to the Rules of Court, confirming and formalising the Court’s reliance on 
circumstantial evidence when a party in the case is not cooperating fully in the process. The 
Rule states:  
Where a party fails to adduce evidence or provide information requested by the Court 
or to divulge relevant information of its own motion or otherwise fails to participate 
effectively in the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems 
appropriate.  
 
                                                 
85 Most recently Merabishvili v Georgia [GC] Appl no 72508/13 Merits and Just Satisfaction (28 November 
2017) paras 313-315, extracts of which are included in Navalnyy v Russia [GC] Appl no 29580/12 Merits and 
Just Satisfaction (15 November 2018). Also Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC] Appl no 16483/12 Merits and Just 
Satisfaction (15 December 2016), para 168. 
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This is undoubtedly useful to the Court, since it puts beyond question its use of inference in 
cases of this of kind, though it is also noted above that this only captures part of the Court’s 
approach. If the SoP is still to be met with the highest possible certainty, an obvious corollary 
of inference is the possibility of its rebuttal. The intimate connection between SoP and BoP in 
this context is thus very clear, rebuttal representing the reversed BoP. The Court’s practice 
reflects this and its approach breaks down into three main elements. First the Court makes a 
statement that its SoP is BRD. Second, it recognizes the respondent government is in the 
stronger position and asserts its option to make inferences. Third, when the government fails 
to supply information, the Court considers the merits of the case based on the facts submitted 
by the applicant (ie. rebuttable inference), with or without corroboration from a third source. 
Rule 44C§1 however, does not mention a reversed BoP. This, together with the Court’s 
inconsistent direct use of the Rule in its case law, where it more often adopts the approach 
but cites case law and not the Rule, raises questions as to the Rule’s continued relevance.   
Although it has been operative for fifteen years, the Court has applied the Rule expressly 
in only a small number of cases.86 This on its own is no great surprise: the Court not being a 
court of first instance, the facts in the majority of cases have been settled long before they 
reach Strasbourg. Accordingly, relevant cases are drawn from only a relatively small cluster 
where facts are disputed, within which the Court must also observe, and have need to 
address, a situation where one of the parties in the dispute is not fully participating. The type 
of issues covered when the Court has invoked the Rule confirms that it is mostly needed 
where the stakes are very high indeed: generally a matter of life, and/or physical safety. 
However, there are significantly more cases in which lack of state cooperation has caused the 
Court to make inferences and reverse the BoP without citing the Rule, than when it has. 
                                                 
86 At the time of writing, (February 2019), the Court has directly invoked the rule on 24 occasions. In a handful 
of further cases the Rule has been referred to, but not applied.  
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Accepted, BoP is not included in the Rule, but the reversed BoP comes into operation only 
when inference has been made, hence the Rule is applicable in every one of these cases. Yet 
in 2018 and 2017, the Court reversed the BoP, respectively, in thirteen and fourteen cases, 
while directly invoking the Rule in only in two.87 In 2016, although the Court reversed the 
BoP in twenty-seven cases, not once did it refer to Rule 44C§1. Indeed, since 2010, Rule 
44C§1 has been invoked in only seventeen cases, but the BoP reversed in many more.  
Why does this matter? Firstly, it is helpful and not unreasonable to expect a court, not 
least an international court of the Court’s standing, to be consistent. Whilst its approach is 
consistent, the Court’s direct reference to Rule 44C§1 is not, without there being any obvious 
objective difference between cases where the Rule is or is not cited. Lack of consistency may 
have implications for the strength, efficiency and legitimacy of decisions, and even if that 
risk is overstated, a consistent approach would nevertheless reinforce the credibility of the 
Court’s approach. Secondly, if reliance on the approach as set out in abundant case law is 
enough, there is doubt over the added value of retaining the Rule: a doubt that is only 
emphasised by its incompleteness. Arguably the Rule legitimates the Court’s approach, but 
the Court has developed other principles through its case law, such as proportionality and 
margin of appreciation, without the need to codify them in its Rules of Procedure. Moreover, 
since the BoP is not accommodated in the Rule, the case law will always need to be cited in 
any event.  
This appears to yield three options for the Court, the first of which is to do nothing and 
continue being inconsistent. For the reasons above, this is the least desirable choice. 
Secondly, the Court could get rid of the Rule altogether, eliminating at the same time the 
available choice of invoking it or not. Or thirdly, the Court could choose to update Rule 
44C§1 to fully reflect the approach set out in its case law, and commit to consistently 
                                                 
87 Merabichvili and Navalnyy, supra n 85. 
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referring to that updated Rule on every occasion it is applied. Both these latter two options 
would improve consistency, but the third is preferable. Rule 44C§1 provides the Court with a 
certain level of insurance from criticism, even if it is not directly invoked by the Court, as it 
sets out unambiguously its willingness to make inference and thereby reaffirms legitimacy. 
Revoking the Rule would remove that security, and could conceivably even weaken the 
Court’s position in this regard. Updating the Rule instead would keep in place that security 
and provide two significant opportunities. Firstly, as it updates the Rule, the Court could take 
stock of its approach from across the case law and clarify it fully. Secondly, if the Court were 
in future to refer to the Rule consistently, its use would be a clear warning signal, enabling 
the Council of Europe mechanisms and others more easily to identify patterns across states in 
the relevant case law and from there to look at strategies to address specific issues.  
At present, the Court’s citation of Rule 44C§1 draws particular attention to three states: 
Turkey, Russia and Bulgaria. The full range cases in which the Court has reversed the BoP in 
recent years however, indicates a pattern of behaviour also from Azerbaijan, Ukraine and 
Lithuania. These states would be missed in looking purely to direct use of the Rule.  
 
6.4 Observations 
In summary of this Section a series of observations can be made. Firstly, when the Court 
makes inferences this has significant implications for both the SoP and the BoP. Rule 44C§1 
formalizes the Court’s use of inference first introduced in Ireland as capable of satisfying the 
BRD standard. Inference became a more vital tool to the Court when it was faced in the 
1990s with an unhealthy power differential between the State and applicants in disappearance 
cases in which Turkey attempted to subvert process. The Court’s general approach in such 
circumstances has evolved so that the Court is willing to make inferences of fact. Since, as 
fairness requires it, these inferences are rebuttable, the result is a shift in the BoP onto the 
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respondent state, i.e. the onus then falls on the state to disprove the alleged facts. Rule 44C§1 
is an enabler of sorts, removing any argument in a given case that the Court’s use of 
inference is inappropriate, it essentially reinforces the legitimacy of this approach.  
However, the Court does not always refer to the Rule expressly in every case, the 
failure to address which may be something of a lost opportunity for two reasons: to reinforce 
the consistency, strength and legitimacy of relevant decisions; and to identify patterns across 
states and relevant case law. While it is possible only to speculate on the reasons for this 
sometime omission, they may include that the Court’s general approach is not represented in 
its entirety in the Rule itself. The reversed BoP, though the obvious corollary of rebuttable 
inference, is not set down.  
Most critical to this work is that the Court has an established and recognisable 
approach to subversive states, and that on every occasion the approach is deployed it insists 
(verbatim from Ireland) that BRD is its SoP. In spite of this, there is still occasion for doubt 
in these cases for two reasons. Firstly, conclusive evidence is simply not always available to 
the Court: the practical problem the Court’s approach attempts to overcome. Secondly, doubt 
is built into the structure of that approach. The Court can make inferences, but the credibility 
and relative weight of evidence relied on to arrive at these inferences depends on the specifics 
of the case. It follows that the strength of the inferences themselves may vary from case to 
case. This is subject to circumstance and not in the Court’s power to do anything about. 
Where the state is not cooperating but has or, because of its privileged position, should have 
access to more information than the applicant, the approach brings greater parity between the 
parties. Reversing the BoP is designed to force the respondent state’s hand, which must then 
disprove the Court’s inferences. It therefore goes some way to addressing the problem but it 
will not necessarily yield definitive proof of the applicant’s version of events.  
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It is thus tempting to echo Erdal’s sentiments that the Court’s declared SoP is a fiction 
and not BRD at all, irrespective of the Court’s claim to the contrary. However, the Court’s 
conviction is both firm and consistent, and it is this article’s purpose to clarify the Court’s 
interpretation and application of its SoP. Accordingly, it serves better to accept the Court’s 
particular conception of BRD, by its structure, accommodates some degree of uncertainty of 
facts. The critical question is then: how much doubt does the Court’s conception of BRD 
allow for? Or, framed by its opposite, how certain is the Court of facts when it finds BRD, a 
violation? This, through examination of the case law, is the question we turn to now.  
 
7 General Approach in the Case Law: How Certain?  
The Grand Chamber in Nachova v Bulgaria set out some key points in its statement of 
general principles, repeated in subsequent cases.88  Opening with a firm insistence its SoP is 
BRD, it adds three points. Firstly, the purpose of the proceedings are different from those in 
domestic law. The Court’s task of ensuring states are complying with the Convention 
‘conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof.’89 Secondly, the Court is not 
constrained by procedural rules, so can admit and assess evidence as it deems fit. Through a 
‘free evaluation of all evidence’, including inferences drawn from the facts it reaches its 
conclusions. Proof it adds with the Ireland qualifier, can follow from the ‘coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of 
fact.’ Finally, in a nod to the persuasive weight of evidence: 
the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this 
connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the 
                                                 
88 Nachova, supra n 4, para 147; also Creangă and El Masri, supra n 4; Ermakov v Russia Appl no 43165/10 
Merits and just Satisfaction (7 November 2013); Al Nashiri (n 25); Merabichvil and Navalnyy, supra n 85. 
89 Ibid.  
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specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at 
stake.90 
 
The statement confirms the Court’s own particular conception of BRD in the abstract at least. 
It also underscores that the Court works on a case by case basis, its approach led by the facts 
before it, and that some level of uncertainty may still be underlying. Redistribution of the 
BoP is a mechanism to address that but nevertheless, the requisite ‘level of persuasion’ to 
satisfy the Court’s conception may be variable. It is therefore helpful to recall the 
Commission’s view in the Greek case that ‘reasonable doubt’ is ‘a doubt for which reasons 
can be given drawn from the facts presented.’91 It is not ‘a doubt based on a merely 
theoretical possibility or raised in order to avoid a disagreeable conclusion’.92 With this 
measure in mind, let us turn to the case law in which, as will be demonstrated, the Court is 
seen consistently to strive for the highest degree of certainty it can attain in a given case.  
There are two central challenges to this proposition. The first is through a series of 
Bulgaria cases decided between 2005-8 which showed an increasingly loose approach to 
circumstantial evidence. The second is, at first glance, a more recent development by which 
the Court has directly referred to and relied on the constructive knowledge of the state in 
question.  
The Bulgarian cases concerned allegations of inhuman and degrading conditions in 
detention facilities run by the Bulgarian Investigation Services. Since Bulgaria is a State 
Party to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, it receives regular visits 
from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The nature of the 
applications before the Court meant the CPT’s findings were relevant and the Court could 
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look at its published Reports on visits to Bulgaria as additional evidence.93 These decisions 
highlight the Court’s willingness to decide cases based on evidence that was increasingly far 
removed from the immediate allegations before the Court. Specifically, it was prepared to 
base its decisions on the CPT’s visit reports even when the Committee had not visited the 
same facilities as those concerned in the respective applications to the Court.94 In other cases 
the use of CPT reports was directly challenged, but not defeated, because of a gap of up to 
four years between the visit and the inhuman and degrading conditions alleged.95 Inexplicable 
as it is noteworthy, in two Bulgaria cases during this period in which the state was more 
cooperative, the Court did not name the BRD standard at all.96 
In any event Navushtanov v Bulgaria decided in 2007, is a good example in which the 
Court did at least concede the limits of CPT Reports as evidence while nevertheless 
according them significant weight: 
While not directly relevant, because the Velingrad Investigation detention facility was 
never itself visited and the reports cover somewhat different periods, the Court 
considers that the general observations of the CPT in respect of the conditions of 
detention in all Investigation Service detention facilities during its visits, in so far as 
relevant, may also inform it in its decision.97 
 
On this, three points are notable. Firstly, the application concerned two separate detention 
facilities, and whilst Bulgaria made unchallenged submissions about the second, they did not 
                                                 
93 On the relationship between the Court and the CPT, see C Bicknell, M Evans and R Morgan, Preventing 
Torture in Europe (Council of Europe 2018).  
94 I.I. v Bulgaria Appl no 44082/98 Merits and Just Satisfaction (9 June 2005); Staykov v Bulgaria Appl no 
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comment on those in Velingrad. Accordingly, it was in respect of Velingrad only that the 
Court considered the merits based ‘solely’ on the applicant’s version of facts.98 Secondly, as 
Sabeva v Bulgaria also confirms,99 the Court was willing to make inferences and rely on the 
CPT’s findings that were not fully relevant because the CPT included comments in its reports 
about Investigation Service detention facilities generally. According to the CPT, general 
conditions encountered in like facilities four years before the allegations ‘almost without 
exception ... could fairly be described as inhuman and degrading’,100 whilst general 
comments from the visit at roughly the same time as the facts under consideration confirmed 
almost nothing had changed and in some cases conditions had deteriorated.101 Conversely, 
the lack of a general comment on conditions in Bulgarian psychiatric facilities, had in fact 
meant the Court declined to make similar inferences in Sabeva.102 Finally, when all the facts 
were considered, the Court found there had not been a violation of Article 3 ECHR as the 
requisite threshold of severity for inhuman and degrading treatment had not been met. 
Therefore, although Navushtanov opened up the possibility that inference based on relatively 
weak circumstantial evidence could inform a decision, in the case itself, it did not. With no 
comparable case in which a violation has been found, it is therefore impossible to gauge the 
likelihood of that occurring in the future, and it is possible that in reality it never would.  
The remaining relevant case law makes the Court’s thoroughness and the very high 
levels of certainty of facts it requires abundantly clear and it is relevant to consider this first 
before turning to constructive knowledge. El-Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) is one case which leaves almost no room for doubt, although the Court 
still nevertheless reversed the BoP.103 The United States litigation on the same matter was 
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discussed above, though here the Court considered the role FYROM played in El-Masri’s 
extraordinary rendition. There was a significant amount of high quality evidence available to 
it, and the Court was persuaded particularly by the applicant’s detailed, specific and 
consistent accounts. These found support from ‘indirect evidence’, including flight logs. The 
applicant’s case was also supported by both the Marty Report104 and the Fava Report,105 the 
latter of which referred to Khaled El-Masri by name. There was even a written statement 
confirming El-Masri’s incommunicado detention from H.K. who had been FYROM’s 
Minster of the Interior at the relevant time. By triangulating all of the evidence, the Court’s 
‘assumptions’ left little room for doubt, though in the process they still regarded this as 
‘prima facie evidence’ in the applicant’s favour, and reversed the BoP.   
El-Masri may have been unusual for the very high level of certainty the Court was 
able to find in the facts. As already noted, one crucial impediment to full certainty is 
available evidence. The Court’s rigour when faced with extremely challenging evidential 
barriers is especially marked in the cases of Al Nashiri v Poland,106 Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) 
v Poland,107 and Al Nashiri v Romania.108 The first two of these were decided together, and 
there is obvious overlap in the Al Nashiri judgment against Romania. In essence, Al Nashiri 
and Abu Zubaydah were both subjected to extraordinary rendition by the United States 
during which they were transferred to secret and unacknowledged detention facilities known 
as ‘black sites’ located in Poland and run by the CIA. There, at the hands of the CIA, they 
were tortured.109 In Romania contrastingly, the Court did not have evidence to find the CIA 
had tortured Al Nashiri. It did find however, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that he had been held 
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under a particular type of regime (‘standard conditions of confinement’) and that 
cumulatively his conditions and treatment amounted to inhuman treatment.110  
It is not necessary for present purposes to dissect these cases in full, so for reasons of 
overlap Al Nashiri v Poland is taken as illustrative. The evidential barriers included: the 
applicants had not had contact and had restrictions placed on communication with the outside 
world;111 one of the deliberate intentions of rendition is to disorient and isolate the victim;112 
the secrecy surrounding rendition;113 claims of national security compounding this;114 and 
(not an issue in respect of the Romania case), Poland’s failure to submit to the Court relevant 
information to which it had access.115 This last the Court found to be a hindrance of its work 
under Article 38 ECHR, entitling it to draw ‘inferences’.116 ‘[I]n consequence’ of all of these 
barriers, the Court was pragmatic and clear: 
establishment of the facts is to a great extent based on circumstantial evidence, 
including a large amount of evidence obtained through the international inquiries, 
considerably redacted documents released by the CIA, other public sources and 
evidence from the experts and the witness.117  
 
The volume of materials consulted and the highly detailed and considered handling of them 
stands as testament to the Court’s thoroughness.  The facts established are themselves very 
detailed, including flight numbers and dates. Inferences were inevitably made and the BoP 
reversed. Following, it was established BRD, that: on 5 December 2002 Al Nashiri and Abu 
Zubaydah arrived in Szymany on CIA rendition flight N63MU; from which date they were 
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detained in the CIA detention facility codenamed ‘Quartz’ in Stare Kiejkuty, Poland; where 
they were subjected to torture, and; from which the CIA transferred them, leaving Poland, on 
6 June 2003 on rendition aircraft N379P.118 Findings so specific, determined by such careful 
sifting of high volumes of materials in evidence are not suggestive of very much, if any, 
doubt at all.  
The case was brought however, to establish Poland’s role and culpability, a key 
feature of which pertains to its knowledge at the relevant time of what was occurring on its 
territory. Although the Court found Poland must have known about flights landing on its 
territory, the Court accepted that the authorities might not have known exactly the treatment 
to which the applicants were subjected in the ‘black sites’. That is, the Court accepted it was 
not possible to conclusively establish Poland’s direct knowledge of the ill-treatment, 
following which the matter of what they ‘ought to have known’ became key. Hence, a 
fascinating and arguably novel feature of the Poland decisions is the appearance of 
constructive knowledge,119 and this had to be measured by what they should have known at 
the time (not with hindsight).120 Incidentally, at the relevant time in the case against Romania, 
- to which Al Nashiri was transferred after being held in Poland,- there was sufficient 
information in the public domain to presume the authorities knew a serious risk of ill-
treatment existed.121 Considering Poland, the Court articulated that its SoP is BRD with all 
the caveats and explanations already seen.122 It nevertheless, and not unreasonably, found 
constructive knowledge.  
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[G]iven that knowledge and the emerging widespread public information about ill-
treatment and abuse of detained terrorist suspects in the custody of the US authorities, 
[Poland] ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA to detain such persons on its 
territory, it exposed them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention.123 
 
Constructive knowledge acts as a substitute for actual knowledge, and in this way, we can 
regard its use in the Poland cases as inference of a very particular kind. In truth, presumptions 
are already frequently made by the Court, for example when a detained person suffers injury, 
it is presumed the state knows what happened. Although not expressed in the same terms as 
above, in both cases there is a rebuttable presumption made specifically to the context, and 
which necessarily includes knowledge. Hence rather than introducing a new approach, Al 
Nashiri v Poland merely adapts the Court’s pre-existing one to the circumstances, including 
explicit reference to knowledge.  
 There is abundant evidence elsewhere in the case law of the Court triangulating 
evidence, and considering possibilities other than the applicant’s submission to build the most 
credible factual account it can. To give an example, in Alimov v Turkey, and Yarashonen v 
Turkey the Court took on board the CPT’s findings about overcrowding and conditions at 
Kumkapi Removal Centre for migrants,124considering that with three years having elapsed 
between the Committee’s visit and the allegations, improvements may have been made. But it 
then looked at reports from members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey who had 
visited, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, which confirmed 
the problem remained.   
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There may not always be even this amount of evidence and two additional points 
should be made. The Court will not accept all evidence that is presented to it,125 and there is 
not an automatic preference to the applicant. In Kasymakhunov v Russia for instance, the 
applicant’s submissions were ‘not particularly detailed’ or supported, and when triangulated 
with other evidence the Court was not satisfied BRD of the claim.126 Furthermore, the Court 
is not always persuaded that the applicant’s submissions warrant presumptions and a reversal 
of the BoP.127 Elsewhere the Court has found the government to have discharged the BoP 
successfully.128 Indeed, the Court’s approach to discovering facts is overall quite balanced. In 
most relevant cases where a violation is found, the victim’s account is detailed and 
consistent, a factor that carries a lot of persuasive weight with the Court. Chernetskiy v 
Russia,129 which application included detailed and consistent information of police ill-
treatment, is a case in example. It was relevant also that Chernetskiy’s injuries were 
concordant with the medical evidence. The Court was not prepared to accept however, 
evidence on the medical file which said the applicant had been beaten by ‘unknown persons’ 
at a specified time before he had come into police custody. According to the Court this was 
‘not a conclusion made by the doctor on the basis of a medical expert examination, but 
information received from an unspecified source.’130 The BoP was reversed and when neither 
the Russian authorities conducting the inquiry into the applicant’s allegations, nor the 
Russian government, could give a ‘convincing explanation’ of how Chernetskiy acquired his 
injuries, inhuman and degrading treatment was established.  
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Chernetskiy is a useful illustration that maps well with disappearance cases in which 
there is similarly less than ideally conclusive, but nevertheless strong prima facie evidence of 
facts. The Court’s selectivity of information on the medical file – distinguishing discovery of 
lesions on the body from reporting of reasons, - demonstrates its detailed consideration of all 
evidence. Moreover, where the evidence is not as strong as might be hoped, it is clear 
reversing the BoP plays a vindicating role for the Court, strengthening the accuracy of its 
findings. The state has opportunity to disprove an inference and when it cannot, violation 
even if not absolutely certain is nevertheless highly probable. Other cases in which the 
evidence grants a less than ideal level of certainty, still, through triangulation of evidence, 
show a consistently high level of probability in the facts. There is consistently a certainty in 
findings of rights violations that eliminates ‘reasonable doubt’ as defined in the Greek case. 
 
8 Conclusions  
It has been the purpose of this article to address the gap in current understanding of the 
Court’s SoP, with the key aim of clarifying SoP as it is declared, interpreted and applied 
specifically by the Court. Unique from other analyses, the Court’s SoP has necessarily been 
approached herein as a self-contained, stand-alone concept, specific and subject only to the 
Court’s interpretation and application. At the beginning three specific tensions were 
identified which obscure full understanding of the Court’s SoP, of which the first two relate 
directly to interpretation of terms. Through both it was shown the Court has its own 
conception respectively of SoP and BRD, a fact which reinforces the approach taken here of 
focussing exclusively on the Court’s self-contained interpretation and application of its SoP. 
It was demonstrated that the first tension, by which the Court indicates it has only a single 
SoP in spite of considered academic commentary suggesting otherwise, is due to a difference 
in framing of the term. Whereas the Court conceives SoP only narrowly as a standard 
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applying to proof of facts, it is elsewhere interpreted as having broader scope. The narrow 
construction informs the Court’s position that it requires proof BRD to find a violation of a 
Convention right. BRD is itself subject to different interpretations, which forms the problem 
of the second tension. The Court has, through the history of BRD’s use as its standard, 
encountered issues with access to evidence, including uncooperative states working against 
the judicial process. For this reason the Court had to adapt, and adopt its own nuanced 
approach whereby it is prepared to make inferences and reverse the BoP. This leaves room 
for some level of uncertainty for two reasons: the Court does not always have access to all 
relevant facts; and its approach of making inferences, by its structure and by definition, 
makes accommodation for some doubt. An inference is not full proof of fact. Nevertheless 
when the Court’s approach is considered in full, and its application is assessed through the 
case law, it is abundantly clear the Court when it finds a violation in this way leaves very 
little, if any, room for real doubt.  
To this an additional observation can be made. The Court in its overall statement of 
position in Ireland and since has not been speaking of proving individual fact(s) BRD, 
although in respect of certain facts within a judgment it often does this also. Rather the BRD 
proof is required to find whether there has been a violation of the relevant Convention 
right.131 The distinction is subtle but important, and the El-Masri and Al Nashiri cases 
reinforce it. Every single fact does not have to be proven, but the view formed overall from 
the available information must be proof BRD of a factual (as opposed to persuasive) point, 
that the violation occurred. It is demonstrated in this work that the Court achieves this, 
including by the additional guarantee of a reversed BoP which levels the ground between 
otherwise unequal parties. As assessment of the case law shows, the Court’s approach in 
respect of uncooperative states is demonstrably clear, consistent and fairly applied.  
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Rule 44C§1 on the other hand, is incomplete in its coverage of the Court’s approach, 
and is unevenly and inconsistently invoked expressly by the Court. For this reason it is 
argued above that the Rule should be updated to comprehensively reflect the Court’s 
approach as we see it in the case law, and that the Court should also then consistently refer to 
the Rule when it makes presumptions and reverses the BoP. Doing so would not only 
strengthen legitimacy, but also make it easier for the Court, other Council of Europe 
institutions and interested parties more broadly to identify patterns of uncooperative state 
behaviour and seek solutions to address them.    
What remains uncertain is the reason for such a high evidential threshold as BRD. 
The tension itself was presented only briefly in Section 3. Though it may well be bound up in 
concerns over legitimacy, or quite possibly, albeit never declared as such, to serve a right to 
truth. The answer is not fully obvious. It does not seem from analysis of the second tension 
above however that the high threshold presents any particular impediment to the Court’s 
fulfilment of its purpose. If it did we would expect more cases like Kurt, and almost certainly 
no violation findings in the rendition cases. In the final analysis, across all three tensions with 
their various pulls and crosswinds of challenge, the Court may be walking a tightrope but for 
the present, it is keeping its balance well.  
 
